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Abstract—Fraud review significantly damages the business
reputation and also customers’ trust to certain products. It
has become a serious problem existing on the current social
media. Various efforts have been put in to tackle such problems.
However, in the case of cold-start where a review is posted by
a new user who just pops up on the social media, common
fraud detection methods may fail because most of them are
heavily depended on the information about the user’s historical
behavior and its social relation to other users, yet such infor-
mation is lacking in the cold-start case. This paper presents
a novel Joint-bEhavior-and-Social-relaTion-infERable (JESTER)
embedding method to leverage the user reviewing behavior and
social relations for cold-start fraud review detection. JESTER
embeds the deep characteristics of existing user behavior and
social relations of users and items in an inferable user-item-
review-rating representation space where the representation of a
new user can be efficiently inferred by a closed-form solution and
reflects the user’s most probable behavior and social relations.
Thus, a cold-start fraud review can be effectively detected accord-
ingly. Our experiments show JESTER (i) performs significantly
better in detecting fraud reviews on four real-life social media
data sets, and (ii) effectively infers new user representation in
the cold-start problem, compared to three state-of-the-art and
two baseline competitors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social media is becoming increasingly significant and heav-
ily affects our daily life. Unfortunately, a large proportion of
social media reviews are proposed by fraudsters for strong
incentives of profit and reputation [1]. For example, 25%
of Yelp reviews could be fraud as reported in 20131. This
proportion has increased rapidly as observed in 20172. As a
result, effectively detecting such fraud reviews is a critical task
that has great business values [2].
Current efforts on fraud review detection mainly focus on
analyzing the behavior and social relations of users and/or
items corresponding to reviews [3]–[6]. They assume a fraud
review may be posted by a user who has anomalous behavior,
e.g. posted a lot of reviews within a short period. They also
assume many fraud reviews are manipulated by a group of
collaborative fraudsters, which may generate abnormal social
relations of the fraudsters and their manipulated items. Be-




a good distinguishing ability, they have shown remarkable
performance in detecting fraud reviews [7].
Although recent years have seen significant progress made
in fraud review detection, detecting fraud reviews with the
cold-start problem, i.e. a new user just posted a new review,
is still a very challenging task and has been rarely studied.
Specifically, the new users in the cold-start problem pose the
two major challenges below. (i) A new user does not have
historical information [8]. However, most of existing fraud
review detection methods require the historical information
to analyze user behavior [3], [4]. (ii) A new user does not
show any explicit social relation, invalidating the detection of
potential collaborative fraud review manipulation [6], [9].
To detect fraud reviews with the above cold-start problem,
review content-based methods, such as [1], [10], [11], are the
major solutions. They identify spam patterns, such as outlier
review length and the large percentage of capital words, in
the review content. Consequently, they avoid the negative
effects brought by the lack of historical information and social
relations in the cold-start case. Recent efforts further embed
the relations between users, items and reviews into a vector
representation of review content, resulting in a significantly
better performance [8], [12].
However, an indistinguishable problem may arise: review
content-based methods may fail to distinguish fraud reviews
from honest reviews when the fraud and honest reviews have
the same content. For example, review content-based methods
cannot identify whether a review “the product is good” is
fraud or honest, because the review content is easy to be
imitated [9]. As a result, purely review content-based methods
are ineffective when dealing with real-life fraud reviews [1].
In this paper, we propose a novel Joint bEhavior and
Social relaTion infERable embedding (JESTER) method for
fraud review detection with the cold-start problem. To solve
the indistinguishable problem, JESTER considers a reviewing
activity, which contains a user, an item, a review and a rating
given by the user for the item. Subsequently, reviews with
the same content can be distinguished if they are posted by
different users for different items with different ratings. To
tackle the challenges in the cold-start problem, JESTER jointly
embeds the user behavior and user/item social relations into
an inferable user-item-review-rating representation space, in
which the representation of a new user can be inferred through
a closed-form solution.
Specifically, JESTER embeds a co-occurrence based user
reviewing behavior by maximizing the success rate of existing
behavior under a designated measure. It further embeds the
user/item social relations according to the context information
generated by random walks in the user-item networks, which
is constructed by the reviewing activities. In the embedding
process, JESTER seamlessly integrates the user/item social re-
lations with user reviewing behavior to form the inferable user-
item-review-rating representations. For a new user, JESTER
infers the user representation as the one that can maximize
the behavior success rate. In this way, JESTER enables an
effective cold-start fraud review detection.
Accordingly, this paper makes three major contributions:
• We propose a novel representation learning method,
JESTER, catering for cold-start fraud review detection
in social media. JESTER jointly embeds user reviewing
behavior and user/item social relations into inferable user-
item-review-rating representations, and thus, the repre-
sentations are more reliable for cold-start fraud detection
than features which are extracted from review content.
• We propose a novel co-occurrence based user reviewing
behavior embedding method. The embedded user review-
ing behavior enables an efficient closed-form solution for
the inferring of a new user representation.
• We seamlessly integrate the user/item social relations
with user reviewing behavior. The integrated social re-
lations provide more comprehensive evidence for fraud
review detection, especially for reviews with collaborative
manipulation.
Comprehensive experiments on four large real-world data
sets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model
compared with three state-of-the-art and two baseline methods.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Fraud Review Detection
Fraud review detection was initially studied in [13], and has
long been an attractive research topic since then. Later, more
efforts were made on employing user’s behavior features, e.g.
the historical reviewing statics of a user and the reviewing bias
of a user [10], [14]–[19]. Also, Mukherjee et al. [20] proved
that user’s behavioral features are more effective than linguistic
features for fraud detection. Besides the behavioral features,
graph-based methods have been intensively studied. These
methods reveal the users/items social relation, i.e. the user-user
relation, item-item relation, and user-item relation, to identify
fraud reviews. The intuition behind this is reviews posted by
similar users or described similar items would have similar
credibility. Wang et al. [21] first introduces review graph to
capture the relationships between users and items. Spotting
fraudster groups were then explored by network footprints
[3], community discovery with sentiment analysis [22], social
interactions for sparse group [23]. In-depth, Hooi et al. [9]
involved dense subgraph mining for group fraud detection,
targeting on detecting camouflage or hijacked accounts who
manipulate their writing to look just like honest users.
B. Cold-Start Problem
The cold-start problem in fraud review detection has rarely
been studied. Although review content-based method, i.e.
extracting linguistic features to identify fraud reviews [18],
[24]–[26], can alleviate the cold-start problem, they are insuf-
ficient when dealing with real life fraud reviews [1]. Recently,
Wang et al. [12] embeds the relation between existing users,
items, and reviews into the review representation that makes
a significant progress in cold-start fraud review detection.
Motivated by [12], You et al. [8] further leverage both attribute
and domain knowledge information for better understanding
review representation.
While the existing research on cold-start problem focus
on user’s review representation, we believe fraud reviews
are easy to be manipulated to look like honest reviews [9]
and thus may confuse existing methods. In this paper, we
propose a novel model for jointly embedding user reviewing
behavior and users/items social relations into inferable user-
item-review-rating representations for fraud reviews detection
with cold-start problem. Accordingly, the inferred new user
representation and the well represented item, review, and rating
information provide more comprehensive evidence for fraud
review detection with cold-start problem.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A. Representation Learning Architecture
The representation architecture of JESTER model is shown
in Figure 1. Given a reviewing activity, i.e. a user u write a
review t for an item d with a rating r, JESTER adopts an
embedding network to represent u, t, d, r to m-dimensional
vector representations u, t,d, r ∈ Rm, respectively. Here m
is a hyperparameter that determines the representation capacity
and can be adjusted according to different social media data.
JESTER further feeds these representations into a neural net-
work for fraud review detection. In the representation learning
process, JESTER simultaneously considers three tasks: user
reviewing behavior learning, social relation preservation, and
fraud review detection, corresponding to three learning loss
functions: behavior learning loss, social relation preservation
loss, and fraud detection loss. By jointly optimizing these
three loss functions, JESTER learns the user-item-review-
rating inferable representations for fraud review detection.
To enable an efficient inferring process of the new user
representation, we constrain the u, t,d, r as unit vector, i.e.
‖u‖2 = ‖t‖2 = ‖d‖2 = ‖r‖2 = 1. The property of this
constraint will be further discussed in Sec. III-F.
B. JESTER Network Structure
To achieve the above learning objectives, the neural network
structures in JESTER model are designed as follows.
The embedding network consists four parts: user embedding
layers, item embedding layers, review embedding networks,
and rating embedding layers. The embedding layers have a
Fig. 1. The Proposed JESTER Model
two-layer structure where the first layer is a fully connected
layer with m nodes and the second layer is a normalization
layer. While the fully connected layer maps the input to a
vector, the normalization layer normalizes the vector to its unit
vector. The review embedding networks can be implemented
by any text embedding network, e.g. recurrent neural network,
followed by a normalization layer. Followed by [12], in
this paper, we implement the text embedding network as a
convolutional neural network (CNN) used in [12].
The fraud review detection network is implemented by
a fully connected neural network with the concatenate of
user-item-review-rating representation vectors as the input and
the fraud label as the output. In the fully connected neural
network, the ReLU activation function is used in the hidden
layers, and the sigmoid activation function is used in the
output layer. The number of hidden layers and the number
of nodes in each hidden layer are two hyper-parameters that
can be adjusted according to different data.
C. User Reviewing Behavior Learning Loss
Inspired by [27], we propose a co-occurrence based user
reviewing behavior. The user reviewing behavior can be for-
mally defined as follows:
Definition III.1. (User Reviewing Behavior) In the context of
the reviewing activity, a user reviewing behavior is a relation-
ship among a user, an item, a review, and a rating. Denoting the
user, item, review, rating as u, t, d, r, respectively, the behavior
b can be represented as a set {u, t, d, r}.
We say a behavior b = {u, t, d, r} is success if the u, t, d
and r consists a reviewing activity, i.e. the user u posted the
review d to the item t with the rating r. We here introduce
a measure to estimate the success rate of the user reviewing
behavior from u, t, d, r. Following [27], we first represent the
behavior as the sum of vector representations of user, item,
review, and rating as follows,
b = u+ t+ d+ r, (1)
d = fψ(d) is the review embedding calculated by a neural
network fψ with parameters ψ. Then, we use the length of
vector b to measure the success rate of a user reviewing
behavior. Specifically, the longer vector b implies a larger
behavior success rate. Consequently, if the vector orientation
of u, t,d, r are more similar in the representation space, the
behavior b = {u, t, d, r} has higher success rate, as shown in
Figure 2. Considering a behavior will be either success or fail
in reality, we map the success rate to a probability close to 1
or 0 by the following success probability function,
s(b) = 2 · 1
1 + e−‖b‖2
− 1. (2)
We denote the observed behavior success probability as
Fig. 2. The Representation Space of JESTER. In this figure, u, t,d, r refer
to the representations of user, item, review, and rating, respectively.
ŝ(·) where ŝ(b) = 1 if b is observed in the social media
and ŝ(·) = 0 otherwise. While s(·) describes the behavior
success distribution in the representation space, ŝ(·) reflects
the observed behavior success distribution in the social media.
To embed the user reviewing behavior into the user-item-
review-rating representations, we minimize the KL-divergence
between the behavior success distribution in the representation










where B+ = {b1, · · · , bnd} is the set of observed behavior in
a social media data set with nd reviews. Considering ŝ(b) = 1







However, Eq. (4) only captures the distribution of the suc-
cessful behavior, i.e. b ∈ B+, but ignores the unsuccessful
behavior, i.e. b 6∈ B+. In practical, it is impossible to enumer-
ate all unsuccessful behavior because of the huge behavior
space. Inspired by the negative sampling used in word2vec
[28], we randomly sample a set of unsuccessful behavior B−
and measure their probability in the representation space as
follows,
s∗(b) = 2 · 1
1 + e‖b‖2
. (5)
The s∗(b) will be large, i.e. the behavior b is likely unsuc-
cessful, if the vector orientation of u, t,d, r is diverse in the
representation space. To capture the unsuccessful behavior, we
minimize the KL-divergence between the behavior unsuccess-
ful distribution in the representation space and the sampled
















D. Social Relation Preservation Loss
For a social reviewing data Q with a set of users U =
{u1, u2, · · · , unu} and a set of items T = {t1, t2, · · · , tnt},
we extracts a bipartite graph G from Q as G = (U, T,E),
where U and T are as the vertices on two sides of G,
respectively, and E ⊆ U × T defines the inter-set edges.
Here, the edge eui,tj in E carries a non-negative weight
wui,tj , reflecting the strength between the user ui and item
tj , and the wui,tj will be zero if user ui does not review
item tj . Accordingly, the weights in the bipartite graph can be
represented by a nu × nt matrix W = [wui,tj ].
The users/items social relation in the bipartite graph reflects
the cooperation of fraudsters for specific suspicious items,
which is essential for collaborative fraud detection for reviews
with camouflage [6], [9]. We preserve the users/items social
relations by embedding them in the user-item-review-rating
representations. The social relation embedding procedure cap-
tures both the explicit and implicit relations of users and items
as illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The Users/Items Social Relation Embedding Workflow.
1) Explicit Relations Embedding: The explicit relations
refer to the direct links between users and items through edges
in a bipartite graph G, which reflect the preference of users
to items. We assume the representations of a user and an
item should be similar if the user prefers the item. Under
this assumption, actually, the explicit relations have already
preserved in the user reviewing behavior learning. Specifically,
if a user ui and an item tj is directly linked in graph G, i.e.
the user ui have posted a review to the item tj , they must be
involved in a success behavior b ∈ B+. By optimizing the loss
function (7), ui and tj will have similar vector orientations in
the representation space as shown in Figure 2. Because both
ui and tj are unit vectors, similar vector orientations indicate
similar vector representations. As a result, the explicit relations
embedding has been already achieved by the user reviewing
behavior learning.
2) Implicit Relations Embedding: The implicit relations
refer to the relations between users/items that are not directly
connected by edges. In a graph, two users/items may have
an implicit relation if exists a path between them where a
path is a sequence of a limited number of edges with shared
vertices. The users/items implicit relations reveal the potential
similarity between users/items. Similar to [29], we reconstruct
the bipartite graph G into two graphs G(u) and G(t) to discover
the implicit relations where G(u) only contains user vertices
U and G(t) only contains item vertices T . In G(u), ui and uj
will have an edge eui,uj if exists a tk that eui,tk ∈ E and
euj ,tk ∈ E where E is the edge set of G. In G(t), ti and tj
will have an edge eti,tj if exists a uk that euk,ti ∈ E and
euk,tj ∈ E where E is the edge set of G. Similar to [30], we









wuk,ti · wuk,tj . (9)
To embed the implicit relation, we need to discover the
paths in the graph G(u) and G(t). However, counting all
paths in G(u) and G(t) has a great high complexity, which
is impracticable for social media data. Inspired by DeepWalk
[31], we perform a truncated random walks on a graph from
each node where the weight of an edge is proportional to
the walking probability on the edge. Subsequently, we adopt
the walked edges as the paths to reveal the implicit relation.
In other words, two vertices are treated having an implicit
relation if they are in a random walk path. The random walk
paths generation procedure generates a set of random walk
paths D(u) of U and a set of random walk paths D(t) of T .
We assume two users or items in the same path have
implicit relation that they will have or be affected by a
similar user reviewing behavior. To seamlessly integrate the
implicit relations with user reviewing behavior, we maximize
the similarity of the orientations of vector of users/items in
the representation space if they are in the same path. In
this way, these users/items will have similar user reviewing
behavior success rate according to Eq. (2). The similarity
of the orientations of vectors can be measured by cosine
function. Since all representations are unit vector, it equals
to an inner dot of two vectors. Accordingly, we can calculate
the probability of two vertices (can either be user or item) in
a path from their vector representations as follows,






where v is the vector representation of v. For the vertices that
are not in a path, their probability can be calculated as,






Similar to Eq. 7, we minimize the KL-divergence between the
distribution of vertices in a path in the representation space and
the observed distribution of vertices in a path in social media



























where P refers to a path in D(·), CP (·i) refers the other
vertices of in the path P instead of ui or ti, and C−(·i)
refers to the negative sampled vertices that do not in any path
contained ui or ti.
E. Joint Loss Function
Denoting the fraud detector network as fω , the predicted
fraud label l to a review in a successful behavior b equals to:
l(b) = fω(u, t,d, r), (13)
where ω refers to the parameters of the fraud detector network,
and u, t, d, and r consist b. In the learning process, we adopt
cross entropy to evaluate the loss of the fraud detector network.
Denoting the supervised fraud review label of b as l̂(b), the




−(l̂(b) log l(b) + (1− l̂(b)) log(1− l(b))). (14)
JESTER jointly optimize the user reviewing behavior learn-
ing loss, the social relation preservation loss, and the fraud
detector network loss to learn the inferable user-item-review-
rating representations. The joint loss function is as follows,
L = α1L1 + α2L2 + α3L3 (15)
where α1, α2, and α3 are hyper-parameters that control the
affects of three L1, L2 and L3.
F. User Representation Inferring in Cold-start Problem
For a review proposed by a new user, JESTER first rep-
resents the item, review, and rating into their representations
{t,d, r}. It then infers the user representation by optimizing






which aims to maximize the behavior success rate according to
the item, review and rating representations. Finally, it feeds the
four representations u, t,d, r into the learned fraud detector
network fω to predict the fraud label.
The objective function Eq. (16) can be efficiently solved
by a closed-form solution. Maximizing Eq. (16) equals to
maximizing the ‖u+t+d+r‖2. Given t,d, and r, as shown in
Figure 4, the u that can maximize ‖u+t+d+r‖2 must in the
direction of t+ d+ r. Considering the unit vector constraint






Fig. 4. The New User Representation Inferring.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Data Sets
Following the literature [8], [12] about cold-start fraud
detection, our experiments are carried on four real-life data
sets, including Yelp-hotel, Yelp-restaurant, Yelp-NYC, and
Yelp-Zip, which are also commonly used in previous fraud
detection researches [1], [4], [32]. Table I displays the statistics
of the data sets.
We split the original data sets into several subsets according
to the time period to evaluate the fraud review detection
performance in a stable way. We further split each subset into
two parts by setting a time point. The first part includes the
reviews posted before the time point, while the second part
contains the rest reviews. From the second part, we pick up
the reviews which are posted by new users at first time as
cold-start reviews. We train the fraud detection methods on




Training Data Testing Data
Time Period #R Time Period #F #FC #N #NC
Zip 1 24/10/08 – 24/03/09 10530 25/03/09 – 25/06/10 6267 4848 43744 15952
Zip 2 24/03/09 – 24/08/09 13252 25/08/09 – 25/12/09 1396 1075 10220 3820
NYC 1 24/10/08 – 24/03/09 6780 25/03/09 – 25/06/10 3183 2539 27974 11313
NYC 2 24/03/09 – 24/08/09 8243 25/08/09 – 25/12/09 748 594 6664 2754
In this table, #R refers to the number of reviews; #F and #FC refer to the number of fraud reviews and cold-start fraud
reviews, respectively; and #N and #NC refer to the number of honest reviews and cold-start honest reviews, respectively.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the fraud review detection performance of each
method by three metrics, including precision, recall, and F-
score. Here, the precision evaluates the ratio of correct detected
TABLE II
COLD-START FRAUD DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT METHODS
Data Info. JESTER JETB Behavior Bigram Improvement
Name Category P R F P R F P R F P R F P R F
Zip 1
Normal 0.81 0.90 0.85 0.77 1.00 0.87 0.77 0.99 0.87 0.78 0.96 0.86 0.03 -0.10 -0.02
Fraud 0.37 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.05 0.09 0.42 0.10 0.16 -0.17 0.11 0.11
Zip 2
Normal 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.79 0.99 0.88 0.80 0.92 0.85 0.02 -0.16 -0.05
Fraud 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.45 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.06 0.11 0.37 0.17 0.23 -0.21 0.13 0.08
NYC 1
Normal 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 1.00 0.90 0.82 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.96 0.89 0.02 -0.16 -0.06
Fraud 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.08 0.13 -0.12 0.18 0.13
NYC 2
Normal 0.85 0.90 0.87 0.82 1.00 0.90 0.82 1.00 0.90 0.83 0.94 0.88 0.02 -0.10 -0.03
Fraud 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.12 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.10
Precision (P), Recall (R) and F-score (F) are reported per normal and fraud reviews. The best results are highlighted in bold.
reviews over all detected reviews, recall reflects the ratio of
undetected reviews over all relevant reviews, and the F-score
indicates an average of precision and recall. We use all of
them because the fraud detection in an imbalance classification
problem [33], i.e. the number of fraud reviews are much less
than honest reviews, that cannot be considered only from
either precision or recall perspective. We report these three
metrics per ground-truth honest and fraud classes to illustrate
the performance for different categories, and further average
them to show the overall performance. Higher precision, recall,
and F-score indicate a better performance.
We follow the literature [4], [12] to use the results of the
Yelp commercial fake review filter as the ground-truth for
performance evaluation. Although its filtered (fraud reviews)
and unfiltered reviews (honest reviews) are likely to be the
closest to real fraud and honest reviews [1], they are not
absolutely accurate [17]. The inaccuracy exists because it is
hard for the commercial filter to have the same psychological
state of mind as that of the users of real fraud reviews who
have real businesses to promote or to demote, especially for
cold-start problems.
C. Parameters Settings
In our experiments, we use a CNN network to embed
reviews following [12]. The CNN network adopts 100 filters
with size 3 × 100 on the pre-trained 100-dimensional word
embedding by GloVe algorithm [34] 3. We embed the user,
item and rating into a 100-dimension vector representation.
We implement the fraud detector network by a 3-layer fully
connected neural network with 100 nodes in the hidden
layers and use ReLU as the activation function of all hidden
nodes. We train our model by Adam [35] and batch size 32.
For the parameters in the compared methods, we take their
recommended settings.
D. Effectiveness on Cold-start Fraud Detection
1) Experimental Settings: JESTER is compared with the
state-of-the-art method JETB [12]. This method handling cold-
start problem by considering entities (user, item and review)
relations to embed reviews. When a new user posted a new
3The pre-trained word embedding can be downloaded from:
http://nlp.stanford.edu/data/glove.6B.zip
review, this review can be represented by the trained network
and classified by the classifier. In the literature [12], support
vector machine (SVM) is used as the fraud classifier based
on the JETB generated review features. However, SVM is
with a time complexity O(n3), where n is the number of
training samples. It is not suitable for the problem with large
amount of data. To make JETB practicable, we use a 3-layer
fully connected neural network instead of SVM as the fraud
classifier of JETB.
We further compared with two review content-based fraud
detection methods used in [12] as baseline competitors. Both
of them extract features from review content, and feed these
features into a classifier for fraud review detection. Specifi-
cally, the first method (denoted as Bigram) uses the bigram
feature. The second method (denoted as Behavior) uses (i)
the bigram feature, (ii) the length of review, (iii) the absolute
rating diversity of a review compared with other reviews of
the same item, and (iv) the similarity of a review to its most
similar reviews of the same item under the cosine similarity.
We also use 3-layer fully connected neural network as their
fraud classifier.
2) Findings - JESTER Significantly Outperforming the
State-of-the-art Cold-start Fraud Detection Method: Table
II illustrates the cold-start fraud detection performance of
JESTER compared with JETB, Behavior, Bigram on four time
period of Yelp-Zip and Yelp-NYC data sets. JESTER gains
largely improvement for cold-start fraud review detection, i.e.
0.11, 0.08, 0.13, and 0.10 F-score increase on Zip 1, Zip 2,
NYC 1, and NYC 2, respectively. This averaged performance
improvement is mainly contributed by the increased recall for
the fraud reviews (corresponding recall increase values are
0.11, 0.13, 0.18, and 0.11). As shown in the results, JESTER
slightly “decreases” the performance of honest reviews detec-
tion. This “decreased” may be caused by the noising ground-
truth of the cold-start fraud reviews that do not be detected
by the Yelp commercial filter.
In addition to review, JESTER further leverages information
from user, item, and rating, which are guaranteed by the
inferable representation and enable JESTER to effectively
capture more fraud evidence from multiple views. As a result,
JESTER can achieve significant performance improvement in
cold-start fraud detection.
TABLE III
GENERAL FRAUD DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT METHODS
Data Info. JESTER JETB FRAUDER HoloScope Improvement
Name Category P R F P R F P R F P R F P R F
Zip 1
Normal 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.87 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.02 -0.08 -0.02
Fraud 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.16
Zip 2
Normal 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.02 -0.13 -0.03
Fraud 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.45 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.23 0.25 0.21
NYC 1
Normal 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.01 -0.12 -0.05
Fraud 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.24 0.02
NYC 2
Normal 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.90 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.69 0.77 0.02 -0.08 -0.03
Fraud 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.22 0.16 0.20
Precision (P), Recall (R) and F-score (F) are reported per normal and fraud reviews. The best results are highlighted in bold.
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(h) B: Density on Restaurant.
Fig. 5. User Representation with Density of Different Methods on Yelp-Hotel and Yelp-Restaurant. The sub-figures (a), (b), (c), (d) contain the user
representation information with the ground-truth labels, and the sub-figures (e), (f), (g), (h) show the density in the representation space. S refers to the social
relation embedding-based method, and B refers to the behavior embedding-based method.
E. Effectiveness on General Fraud Detection
1) Experimental Settings: JESTER is further compared
with JETB [12] and two state-of-the-art competitors:
FRAUDER [9] and HoloScope [6] in detecting general fraud
reviews, i.e. all the reviews contained in the testing data set.
Different from JETB which is review content-based method,
FRAUDER and HoloScopre are two social relation-based
fraud review detection methods. Specifically, FRAUDER mod-
els the social relation as a graph and detects fraud reviews by
dense subgraph mining. HoloScope also adopts graph to model
social relation but detects fraud reviews by jointly considering
the graph topology and review temporal spikes.
2) Findings - JESTER Significantly Improving General
Fraud Detection Performance: The precision, recall and F-
score of JESTER, JETB, FRAUDER, and HoloScope are
reported in Table III. Overall, JESTER significantly outper-
forms the competitors in fraud review detection. It improves
0.16, 0.21, 0.20, and 0.20 compared with the best-performing
method in terms of F-score on four data sets for fraud review
detection.
The dramatic performance improvement of JESTER is
mainly contributed by jointly embedding user reviewing be-
havior and user/item social relations in its user-item-review-
rating representations: (1) compared to FRAUDER and Holo-
Scope that capture the social relations, JESTER further con-
siders the user reviewing behavior to effectively detect per-
sonalized fraud; and (2) compared to JETB, JESTER seam-
lessly integrates user/item social relations to avoid camouflage.
Consequently, JESTER obtains up to 0.24 recall improvement
compared with the competitors.
F. Evaluating the Effectiveness of User Reviewing Behavior
and User/Item Social Relations for Fraud Review Detection
1) Experimental Settings: We visualize the user represen-
tation in a two-dimensional space trough TSNE [36], and
plot the ground-truth labels of each user at their positions
in the representation space. The user representation learned
according to user reviewing behavior learning loss function Eq.
(7) is compared with that learned according to social relation
preservation loss function Eq. (12) on Yelp-Hotel and Yelp-
Restaurant data sets.
2) Findings - Behavior-embedded Representation con-
tributes to Personalized Fraud Review Detection and Social
Relation-embedded Representation Contributes to Collabora-
tive Fraud Review Detection: The behavior-embedded and
social relation-embedded user representations are visualized
in Figure 5. As shown in Figure 5, users have more diverse
representations in the behavior-embedded representation space
compared with social relation-embedded representation space.
This indicates more personalized information is captured by
the behavior-embedded representation, which is important to
identify personalized fraud reviews. However, in the behavior-
embedded representation space, the users with large density
are not consistent with the ground-truth fraudster label. In con-
trast, the density of social relation-embedded representation is
consistent with the ground-truth fraudsters distribution. As ev-
idenced by [9], the collaborative manipulation of reviews will
generate density connection between users. Accordingly, the
results demonstrate our embedded social relation is essential
for collaborative fraud review detection. A high quality user
representation will enable a dense distribution for fraudsters
because of the collaborative manipulation [9]. This qualitative
illustrates that the social relation of users is essential for
collaborative fraudsters detection.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a novel joint behavior and social re-
lation inferable embedding method, JESTER, for fraud review
detection with cold-start problem. JESTER jointly embeds
user reviewing behavior and user/item social relations into
the inferable representations of user, item, review and rating,
which provides more comprehensive information for fraud
review detection. For cold-start problem, JESTER efficiently
infers the most probable representation of a new user in
a closed-form solution according to the embedded user re-
viewing behavior. Two large real-word social media data sets
demonstrate the performance of JESTER is substantially better
than the state-of-the-art competitors.
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